SPECIAL EDITION

Special Edition is the blog for security testing business SE Labs. It explains how we test security products, reports on the internet threats we find and provides security tips for businesses, other organisations and home users.

Thursday, 8 June 2017

Brexit and Cybersecurity

Is the UK headed for a cybersecurity disaster?




With Brexit looming and cybercrime booming, the UK can't afford major IT disasters, but history says they're inevitable.

The recent WannaCry ransomware tsunami was big news in the UK. However, it was incorrectly reported that the government had scrapped a deal with Microsoft to provide extended support for Windows XP that would have protected ageing NHS computers. The truth is far more mundane.

In 2014, the government signed a one-year deal with Microsoft to provide security updates to NHS Windows XP machines. This was supposed to force users to move to the latest version of Windows within 12 months, but with a "complete aversion to central command and control" within the NHS, and no spare cash for such an upgrade, the move was never completed.

This isn't the first IT Whitehall IT disaster by a very long way.

During the 1990s, for example, it was realised that the IT systems underpinning the UK's Magistrates' Courts were inadequate. It was proposed that a new, unified system should replace them. In 1998, the Labour government signed a deal with ICL to develop Project Libra. Costing £146m, this would manage the courts and link to other official systems, such as the DVLA and prisons systems.

Described in 2003 as "One of the worst IT projects ever seen", Project Libra's costs nearly tripled to £390m, with ICL's parent company, Fujitsu, twice threatening to pull out of the project.

This wasn't Labour's only IT project failure. In total, it's reckoned that by the time the government fell in 2010, it had consumed around £26b of taxpayer's money on failed, late and cancelled IT projects.

The coalition government that followed fared no better. £150m paid to Raytheon in compensation for cancelling the e-Borders project, £100m spent on a failed archiving system at the BBC, £56m spent on a Ministry of Justice system that was cancelled after someone realised there was already a system doing the same thing: these are just a few of the failed IT projects since Labour left office seven years ago.

The Gartner group has analysed why government IT projects fail, and discovered several main factors. Prominent amongst these is that politicians like to stamp their authority on the nation with grandiose schemes. Gartner says such large projects fail because of their scope. It also says failure lies in trying to re-implement complex, existing processes rather than seeking to simplify and improve on them by design. The problem is, with Brexit looming, large, complex systems designed to quickly replace existing systems are exactly what's required.


A good example is the ageing HM Customs & Excise CHIEF system. Because goods currently enjoy freedom of movement within the EU, there are only around 60 million packages that need checking in through CHIEF each year. The current system is about 25 years old and just about copes. Leaving the EU will mean processing an estimated 390 million packages per year. However, the replacement system is already rated as "Amber/Red" by the government's own Infrastructure and Projects Authority, meaning it is already at risk of failure before it's even delivered.

Another key system for the UK is the EU's Schengen Information System (SIS-II). This provides real time information about individuals of interest, such as those with European Arrest Warrants against them, terrorist suspects, returning foreign fighters, missing persons, drug traffickers, etc.

Access to SIS-II is limited to countries that abide by EU European Court of Justice rulings. Described by ex-Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg as a "fantastically useful weapon" against terrorism, after Brexit, access to SIS-II may be withdrawn.

Late last year, a Commons Select Committee published a report identifying the risks to policing if the UK loses access to SIS-II and related EU systems. The report claimed that then-Home Secretary Theresa May had said that such systems were vital to, "stop foreign criminals from coming to Britain, deal with European fighters coming back from Syria, stop British criminals evading justice abroad, prevent foreign criminals evading justice by hiding here, and get foreign criminals out of our prisons.

The UK will either somehow have to re-negotiate access to these systems, or somehow quickly and securely duplicate them and their content on UK soil. To do so, we will have to navigate the EU's labyrinthine data protection laws and sharing agreements to access relevant data.


If the UK government can find a way to prevent these and other IT projects running into problems during development, there's still the problem of cybercrime and cyberwarfare. Luckily, there's a strategy covering this.

In November 2016, the government launched its National Cyber Security Strategy. Tucked in amongst areas covering online business and national defence, section 5.3 covers protecting government systems. This acknowledges that government networks are complex, and contain systems that are badly in need of modernisation. It asserts that in future there will be, "no unmanaged risks from legacy systems and unsupported software".

The recent NHS WannaCry crisis was probably caused by someone unknowingly detonating an infected email attachment. The Strategy recognises that most attacks have a human element. It says the government will "ensure that everyone who works in government has a sound awareness of cyber risk". Specifically, the Strategy says that health and care systems pose unique threats to national security due to the sector employing 1.6 million people in 40,000 organisations.

The problem is, the current Prime Minister called a snap General Election in May, potentially throwing the future of the Strategy into doubt. If the Conservatives maintain power, there's likely to be a cabinet reshuffle, with an attendant shift in priorities and funding.

If Labour gains power, things are even less clear. Its manifesto makes little mention of cyber security, but says it will order a complete strategic defence and security review "including cyber warfare", which will take time to formulate and agree with stakeholders. It also says Labour will introduce a cyber charter for companies working with the Ministry of Defence.

Regardless of who takes power in the UK this month, time is running out. The pressure to deliver large and complex systems to cover the shortfall left by Brexit will be immense. Such systems need to be delivered on time, within budget and above all they must be secure – both from internal and external threats.

Friday, 19 May 2017

Staying Neutral



Is a fox running the FCC's henhouse?


Net neutrality is a boring but noble cause. It ensures the internet favours no one. So, why is the new chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Ajit Pai, determined to scrap it?

"For decades before 2015," said Pai in a recent speech broadcast on C-SPAN2, "we had a free and open internet. Indeed, the free and open internet developed and flourished under light-touch regulation. We weren't living in some digital dystopia before the partisan imposition of a massive plan hatched in Washington saved all of us…" Pai also says he wants to "take a weed whacker" to net neutrality, and that its "days are numbered".

These are strong words. A possible reason for them is that Pai was previously Associate General Counsel at Verizon. To understand why this is significant, we must delve into recent history.

In 2007, Comcast (owned by Verizon) was caught blocking BitTorrent traffic. This was ruled illegal by the FCC, and in 2009 Verizon settled a class action for $16 million.

In 2011, Verizon also blocked Google Wallet from being downloaded and installed on its phones in favour of its own, now-unfortunately titled ISIS service, which it founded with T-Mobile and AT&T.

In response, the FCC imposed its Open Internet Order, which forced ISPs to stop blocking content and throttling bandwidth.

At the time, ISPs in the US were regulated under Title I of the 1934 Communications Act. This classed them as "information services" and provided for Pai's so-called "light touch" regulation. Title II companies are "common carriers" on a par with the phone companies themselves, and are considered part of the national infrastructure.


Verizon went to court, and in 2014 successfully argued that the FCC had no authority to impose its will on mere Title I companies. This backfired. In 2015, the FCC decided that ISPs were now part of the national infrastructure, and made them Title II companies. Problem solved, dystopia averted.

Times have changed, and the new Washington administration is keen to roll back what it sees as anti-business Obama-era regulation. Pai was appointed chairman of the FCC in January this year. Given his past at Verizon, his attitude to abolishing net neutrality raises real concerns about the internet's future.

In an April 2017 interview on PBS News Hour, Pai was asked a direct question: supposing a cable broadcaster, like Comcast, created a TV show that competed with an equally popular Netflix show. Without net neutrality, what's to stop Comcast retarding Netflix traffic over its own network, while prioritising that of its own show?

"One thing that's important to remember," came Pai's reply, "is that it is hypothetical. We don't see evidence of that happening…" In fact, net neutrality ensures this situation cannot currently happen, which is why there's no evidence of it.

Taking a wider view, Pai's attitude is also curiously uninformed given that his own web page at the FCC shows that from 2007 to 2011, when neutrality violations were big news and the FCC had to impose its Open Internet Order, he was the FCC's Deputy General Counsel, Associate General Counsel, and Special Advisor to the General Counsel. After a stint in the private sector, he returned to become an FCC Commissioner in 2012.

In his speech on C-SPAN2, Pai also asked, "What happened after the FCC imposed Title II? Sure enough, infrastructure investment declined."

However, the opposite of this assertion is a matter of public record. As Ars Technica discovered, after Title II was imposed, ISP investment continued to rise. Indeed, Verizon's own earnings release shows that in the first nine months of 2015, now labouring under the apparently repressive Title II, the  company invested "approximately $22 billion in spectrum licenses and capital for future network capacity". 

Interestingly, Pai's page at the FCC also states his regulatory position in a series of bullet points. These include:
  • Consumers benefit most from competition, not preemptive regulation. Free markets have delivered more value to American consumers than highly regulated ones
     
  • The FCC is at its best when it proceeds on the basis of consensus; good communications policy knows no partisan affiliation.
History shows that Title II regulation wasn't pre-emptive. It was a response to increasingly bold and shady practices by ISPs that forced the Commission's hand.

Net neutrality currently maintains the kind of free market that big corporations usually crave. It's a rare example of regulation removing barriers to trade. Companies of all types and sizes are currently free to compete on the internet, but cannot deny others from competing.

Scrapping US net neutrality will also affect non-US internet users who access US-based content via a VPN. At the US end of the VPN, traffic is handed off to a US ISP. If that company favours some sites over others (or even blocks them), the ability to access content will be guided towards the choices set out by commercial interests, just as if the user was in the US.

Given all this, it is perhaps rather cynical that the Bill to remove Title II status from ISPs, sponsored by Republican senator Mike Lee of Utah, is called the "Restoring Internet Freedom Act". With Pai also a declared Republican, and dead set on rolling back Title II, the meeting on May 18th to decide whether to proceed could have been a short one with a distinctly partisan flavour.





Tuesday, 11 April 2017

Testing anti-malware's protection layers

Our first set of anti-malware test results for 2017 are now available.

Endpoint security is an important component of computer security, whether you are a home user, a small business or running a massive company. But it's just one layer.

Latest reports now online

Using multiple layers of security, including a firewall, anti-exploit technologies built into the operating system and virtual private networks (VPNs) when using third-party WiFi is very important too.

What many people don't realise is that anti-malware software often actually contains its own different layers of protection. Threats can come at you from many different angles, which is why security vendors try to block and stop them using a whole chain of approaches.

A fun video we created to show how anti-malware tries to stop threats in different ways


How layered protection works

For example, let's consider a malicious website that will infect victims automatically when they visit the site. Such 'drive-by' threats are common and make up about one third of this test's set of attacks. You visit the site with your web browser and it exploits some vulnerable software on your computer, before installing malware – possibly ransomware, a type of malware that also features prominently in this test.


Here's how the layers of endpoint security can work. The URL (web link) filter might block you from visiting the dangerous website. If that works you are safe and nothing else need be done.

But let's say this layer of security crumbles, and the system is exposed to the exploit.

Maybe the product's anti-exploit technology prevents the exploit from running or, at least, running fully? If so, great. If not, the threat will likely download the ransomware and try to run it.

At this stage file signatures may come into play. Additionally, the malware's behaviour can be analysed. Maybe it is tested in a virtual sandbox first. Different vendors use different approaches.

Ultimately the threat has to move down through a series of layers of protection in all but the most basic of 'anti-virus' products.

The way we test endpoint security is realistic and allows all layers of its protection to be tested.

Our latest reports, for enterprisesmall business and home users are now available for free from our website. Please download them and follow us on Twitter and/or Facebook to receive updates and future reports.

Thursday, 6 April 2017

Back from the Dead

Forgotten web sites can haunt users with malware.

Last night, I received a malicious email. The problem is, it was sent to an account I use to register for web sites and nothing else.

Over the years, I've signed up for hundreds of sites using this account, from news to garden centres. One of them has been compromised. The mere act of receiving the email immediately marked it out as dodgy.

The friendly, well written message was a refreshing change from the usual approach, which most often demands immediate, unthinking action. The sender, however, could only call me "J" as he didn't have my forename. There was a protected file attached, but the sender had supplied the password. It was a contract, he said, and he looked forward to hearing back from me.

The headers said the email came from a French telecoms company. Was someone on a spending spree with my money? My PayPal and bank accounts showed no withdrawals.

Curious about the payload, I spun up a suitably isolated Windows 10 victim system, and detonated the attachment. It had the cheek to complain about having no route to the outside world. I tried again, this time with an open internet connection. A randomly-named process quickly opened and closed, while the file reported a corruption. Maybe the victim system had the wrong version of Windows installed, or the wrong vulnerabilities exposed. Maybe my IP address was in the wrong territory. Maybe (and this is more likely) the file spotted the monitoring software watching its every move, and aborted its run with a suitably misleading message.

Disappointed, after deleting the victim system I wondered which site out of hundreds could have been compromised. I'll probably never know, but it does reveal a deeper worry about life online.

Over the years, we all sign up for plenty of sites about which we subsequently forget, and usually with whichever email address is most convenient. It's surely only a matter of time before old, forgotten sites get hacked and return to haunt us with something more focused than malicious commodity spam – especially if we've been silly enough to provide a full or real name and address. Because of this, it pays to set up dedicated accounts for registrations, or use temporary addresses from places such as Guerrilla Mail.

Friday, 24 March 2017

Inside the CIA...


Who is behind the CIA's hacking tools? Surprisingly ordinary geeks, it seems.

At the start of March came the first part of yet another Wikileaks document dump, this time detailing the CIA's hacking capabilities. The world suddenly feared spooks watching them through their TVs and smartphones. It all made for great headlines.

The Agency has developed scores of interesting projects, not to mention a stash of hitherto unknown zero day vulnerabilities. The dump also gives notes on how to create well-behaved, professional malware that stands the least chance of detection, analysis and attribution to Langley. We've also learned some useful techniques for defeating antivirus software, which the Agency calls Personal Security Products (PSPs).

There's also a deeper tale to tell. It's about the personalities behind the redacted names working on these tools and techniques. They don’t seem so different from anyone else working in infosec.

User #524297 says he is a "Coffee addict, Connoisseur of International Barbecues, and Varied Malt Beverage Enthusiast." Thanks to his comments, we know an ex-boss (nicknamed "Panty-Raider") was considered "really odd". Another had a large, carved wooden desk that went with him from job to job.

User #524297 also maintains a page dedicated to some interesting ideas. One is to use the OpenDNS DNSCrypt service to hide DNS requests emanating from a compromised host.

Another fun-loving User is #71473. He has a page called "List of ideas for fun and interesting ways to kill/crash a process", which enumerates a dozen homebrew techniques and variations. Most are still at the concept stage, but under the list of uses to which they may be put, he includes "Knockover (sic) PSPs" and "Troll people".

He also describes several proof-of-concept tools for his process crashing techniques. One is called DisorderlyShutdown, which waits a programmable amount of time (plus a random offset to make things seem natural) to select a random process to crash in the hope of leading to "data loss and gnashing of teeth". Another is WarheadsToForeheads, which attempts to crash processes. About this tool, he says: "Considering making this an infinite enumeration to squash all user processes and make the user experience especially horrific."

Revealingly, User #71473 also likes to hack the home pages of other Users: " Its 11:30... time to deface people's unprotected user pages..."

User #11628962 was deeply impressed by Subramaniam and Hunt's "Practices of an Agile Developer", and went to great lengths to enumerate the principles behind the work for others in his group. 

Meanwhile, we learn that User # 71475 loves to listen to music online and lists several streaming services and YouTube channels. He's also an avid collector of ASCII-based emoticons. Everyone needs a hobby, right? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Amusingly, User #20873595 is keen for people understand that his last name does not begin with C, implying that it is in fact Hunt. There was also some debate about what User #72907's office nickname should be. "Monster Lite" was the apparent front runner.

We also learned from the dump that some of the Users are heavily into the online card game Hearthstone, which unfriendly foreign state actors are likely now feverishly trying to hack.

The public at large has moved on, and the first of the vulnerabilities highlighted in the dump has been patched, but the industrious CIA hackers who originally found them are still beavering away, creating new tools to replace the old ones, finding new zero-days, thinking up new nicknames, trolling each other, and of course playing Hearthstone.

Tuesday, 7 March 2017

Can You Hear Me?

Are cyber-scammers creating their own fake news stories to exploit? Jon Thompson investigates.

The UK media recently exploded with news of a new phone-based scam. Apparently, all that's needed for fraudsters to drain your bank account is a recording of you saying "yes". It runs as follows:
  1. Someone calls and asks if you can hear them
  2. They record you saying "Yes"
  3. They take your ID and money
What doesn't ring true is the lack of detail between steps 2 and 3. How, exactly, do attackers use this snippet of audio without the rest of your identity? Myth busting site Snopes has the answer: they don't. A good half hour of searching also failed to turn up a single verified victim of the scam despite a huge number of almost identical news reports warning people about it.

Whether it's a hoax or not, it's certainly easy to see how cyber-scammers can take advantage of the generated fear. Your "bank" calls, says you've been the victim of this very scam, and asks you to visit a special web site to enter your details and get your money back. Previous cybersecurity incidents certainly provide good evidence that such secondary scams may soon plague a phone near you.

Remember the TalkTalk hack of October 2015 and the scandalised headlines that followed? Four million customers were suddenly at risk, according to some ill-informed reports. The supposed Russian jihadist gang behind the attack was ransoming the purloined data. The Daily Express even reported that they were already raiding the accounts to fund their evil deeds.

The truth was far more mundane. A 17-year-old boy from Norwich had discovered an SQL injection using a vulnerability scanner, and syphoned off about 157,000 account records. However, with this data potentially in the wild, any attempted fraud experienced by TalkTalk customers was suddenly blamed on the hack.

In fact, telephone-based cyber-fraud is a numbers game. The more calls you make, the more likely it is that you'll hit the right set of circumstances. It's a brute force attack, and that's exactly what the scammers started to do. Nearly 18 months later, they're still finding ways to use the hack as a pretext to call unsuspecting customers.


At the time, some customers even reported that their broadband was being deliberately slowed by criminals, who then called them offering to fix the problem in exchange for visiting a phishing site and entering account details to get a special refund. Again, this is a numbers game: for every set of circumstances that make the scam work, there might be thousands of calls to people with the wrong broadband provider or who have no bandwidth problems. It's never the precision spear phishing attack it's reported to be by the bemused victims.

So, high profile hacks can subsequently spawn profitable campaigns for fraudulent callers keen to cash in on the chaos and fear. The problem is, juicy high profile hacks come along at random. What's needed is something more dependable.

This brings us back to the supposed "Can you hear me?" scam. Several reports in the past few days on Who Called and other very active nuisance call sites have mentioned the scam in passing as something else to look out for, but none say that this was the focus of the call being reported. The story has begun to take on a life of its own, but without any direct evidence that the scam actually exists.

Could it be that scammers themselves have concocted and spread a fake news story, which they intend to subsequently exploit with a campaign? It's not that great a leap of imagination, given the innovations developing in other areas of bulk cybercrime, such as ransomware. Only time will tell, but the next few months should be fascinating for both threat watchers and cyber-criminals alike.



Wednesday, 15 February 2017

17 Things Spammers Get Wrong


No one publishes successful phishing and ransomware emails. Jon Thompson thinks he knows why.

The headlines say phishing scams are at an all-time high, and ransomware is growing exponentially, but conspicuous by their absence are examples of the emails behind successful attacks. It's becoming the cliché in the room, but there may be a reason: embarrassment.


Running an email honeypot network, you receive a flood of malicious email every day. Most is littered with glaring errors that point to lazy, inarticulate crooks trying to make the quickest buck from the least effort. When you do come across a rare, well though-out campaign, it shines like a jewel in a sea of criminal mediocrity.

To the average spammer, however, it's all just a numbers game. He cranks the handle on the botnet, so to speak, and money comes out.

This poses an important question: why, given the quality of most malicious spam, are new ransomware infections and high profile phishing attacks still making headlines almost every single day? Clearly, we're massively overestimating the amount of effort and intelligence invested by spammers.

With that in mind, what follows is a short list of 17 mistakes I routinely see, all of which immediately guarantee that an email is malicious. There are others, but these are the main ones. If this list reflects the mistakes found in the spam behind the headlines, then the size yet lack of sophistication of the problem should become apparent.

1.    No Subject Header

This error is particularly prevalent in ransomware campaigns. Messages whose payloads have very low VirusTotal scores are being sent with no subject header. Maybe the sender thinks it'll pique the curiosity of the recipient, but it should also alert spam filters even before they examine the attachment.

2.    No Set Dressing

Look at any real communication from a bank, PayPal, a store, etc. It is well formatted, the HTML is clean, the language is clear, and the branding is obvious. Legitimate companies and banks don’t tend to send important messages in plain text.

3.    Generic Companies

Generic companies are rare but I do occasionally see them. Who is "the other financial institution" and why has it refused my transaction? Vague, instantiated company names like this, with an accompanying attachment, are clear indicators of spam.

4.    Multiple Recipients

This is another example of laziness on the part of spammers. OK, they may have found an open relay to willingly spread messages rather than buy extra time on a botnet, but anything other than a one-to-one sender to recipient ratio should be an instant red flag.

5.    Poor Salutation

Much apparently personalised spam doesn’t use a competent salutation, or uses a salutation that is simply the user name part of the email address (i.e.: "Dear fred.smith"). It would take effort to code a script that personalises the messages by stripping off the first name and capitalising the initial. Effort is the enemy of the fast buck.

6.    No Body Text

Sending an email with a tantalizing subject header such as "Overdue – Please Respond!" but no body text explaining what or why it's overdue is as common in commodity ransomware as having no subject header. The attack again relies entirely on the natural curiosity of the recipient, who can and should simply ignore it. Spam filters should also take a keen interest.

7.    Auto-translated Body Text

Machine translation has the amusing habit of mapping the grammar of one language onto another, resulting in errors that no native speaker would ever make. Manual translation by a highly fluent speaker is far superior to machine translation, but the translator must also have knowledge of the subject matter for his text to appear convincing. Again, this is effort.


8.    The Third Person

This is a great example of a spam writer trying to distance himself from his crime. "PayPal has detected an anomaly in your account" and "they require you to log in to verify your account" just look weird in the context of a security challenge. This is supposed to be from PayPal, isn't it?

9.    Finger Trouble

I'm fast concluding that some cybercriminals really do wear thick leather gloves while typing, just like in the pictures. Either that or they're blind drunk. Random punctuation marks and extra characters that look like they've been hit at the same time as the correct ones don't make a good impression. Simply rejecting emails that have more than a certain percentage of spelling mistakes might prevent many of these messages from getting through.


10.    Unexpected Plurals and Tenses

Using "informations" instead of "information" is a dead giveaway for spam and should be blocked when in combination with other indicators. Phrases such as "we detect a problem" instead of "we detected a problem" also stick out a mile.


11.    Missing Definite Article

Many spam emails stand out as somehow "wrong" because they miss out the definite article. One recent example I saw read: "Access is blocked because we detect credit card linked to your PayPal account has expired." An associated Yandex.ru return address gave the whole thing a distinct whiff of vodka.

12.    The Wrong Word

"Please review the document and revert back to us immediately". Revert? Really? Surely, you mean "get back", not "revert back". It may be difficult for spam filters to weed out this kind of error, but humans should spot it without difficulty.

13.    Misplaced Emphasis

Unusually capitalised phrases such as "You must update Your details to prevent Your Account from being Suspended" look weird. Initial capitalisation isn't used for emphasis in English sentences, and hints at someone trying to make the message sound more official and urgent than it is.






14.    Tautological Terrors

"It is extremely mandatory that you respond immediately". Not just mandatory but extremely mandatory? Wow, I'd better click that link right away! Urgent calls to action like this overplay the importance of the message in ways that mark them out as fake.








15.    Grandiosity

Using grand words where normal ones should appear to make a message sound more authoritative are a dead giveaway.  Here's an example from last September when a gang famously tried to distribute malware on the back of a new media player release: "To solemnise the release of our new software". Solemnise means to mark with a formal ceremony.

What they really meant was: "To mark the release of our new software".  The whole message was also riddled with the most outrageous auto-translate errors that it made difficult reading.

16.    Overly-grand Titles

Why would the Microsoft Chief Support Manager be contacting me personally all the way from the US to give me a refund? Wouldn't he delegate this important work to a local minion? Similarly, the head of the IMF doesn’t usually spend their days emailing strangers about ATM cards stacked high with cash.


17.    Obfuscated URLs

If the collar doesn't match the cuffs, it's a lie. In other words, if the message contains the name of a high-street bank (for example) and a URL from a shortening service such as bit.ly, spam filters should be blocking the message without question, regardless of the rest of the content.